THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY AND THE

DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY WAS A PERIOD OF UPHEAVAL. SUCH FEATURES
as the decline of demesne farming, the revolts in town and c the Hundred Years War, the Great Schism, the controversy ov Poverty of Christ, and the careers of Ockham and Wyclif, ill how widespread the disturbance was. Yet, our knowledge thought of the period has barely passed beyond its more social and political aspects. Though numerous continental have studied individual thinkers, Michalski's articles remain t general assessment of its climate.1 Even E. Gilson, the le authority on medieval philosophy, cannot do for the four century what he was able to do for earlier periods." The l not firm enough to allow any positive judgement. Term " disintegration " and " decline " are the clearest we have, but are negative, pointing to what was disappearing rather than t was present. This article is an attempt to reverse this emp drawing attention to certain positive features in fourteenth-c thought.3 I Although the thought of the fourteenth century differed radically from that of the thirteenth century, it is too often regarded as a more or less direct continuation of the preceding era. Terms such as Nominalist and Realist, Augustinian and Thomist, are used to describe the thinkers and currents of thought in both periods.4 Yet, the more the fourteenth century is examined the less tenable such a view becomes.
The overriding difference between the two centuries lies in the relation of reason to faith. Scholasticism may, at its broadest, be understood as the application of reason to dogma. The scholastics fixed their sights on the divine, enlisting the support of reason and practical knowledge to attain a fuller understanding of the truths which lay beyond them. With both God and man as its subject, scholasticism differed from both dogma and natural philosophy.
It sought to translate into rational terms the truths that came from revelation alone; though belief was supreme, reason had an essential part to play in elucidating, classifying and, where possible, demonstrat-ing the tenets of faith. Similarly, it was not enough for reason to regard the facts of experience in their own natural light; they had, like the propositions of geometry, to be related to the larger scheme of things.
The method of scholasticism was the disputation, the questio, whereby a problem was posed (e.g. Whether God was the highest good), the arguments pro and contra stated, and the conclusions drawn. While the questio was peculiar to scholasticism, the two are not synonymous and it must not be assumed that where the form of the questio was present there also was scholasticism. This identification has hindered the understanding of the disputes of the fourteenth century, causing them to be regarded too much in the light of those of the previous era.5 Argument for argument's sake is no more the hallmark of scholasticism than of any other method of speculation.6
Until the first decade of the fourteenth century it could be said that faith and reason, although often at odds, had lived in comparative harmony for a century. While there had never been a stable balance to which the vast majority of scholastics had subscribed, the middle years of the thirteenth century, when St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) was developing his system, marked the height of the attempt to harmonize faith with reason. Where previously the traditional outlook, represented by the Augustinians, had regarded all true knowledge as the result of God illuminating the soul, Aquinas made all human knowledge begin with sense perception. From the experience of the senses, the mind, as immaterial, could abstract the true essence and so attain to knowledge. Thus from the individual man, Socrates, the mind could arrive at the concept of Man, the species, with its origin in God. Similarly, everything which existed in this world provided an analogy with God; and in the light of the relation of causes in this world St. Thomas proved the existence of God from the need to have a first cause. St. Thomas's system was the culmination of the effort to fuse the natural and the supernatural into a comprehensive outlook, in which one was complementary to the other. In doing so he utilized the works of Aristotle, which from the beginning of the century had been rapidly rediscovered by the West and translated into Latin. From the start St. Thomas's system was regarded with hostility and suspicion by the more orthodox Augustinians, for whom the sensory and material world was an obstacle rather than an aid to true understanding.
It was not, however, the mere opposition of the Augus Thomism that marked the end of the classical period of ism; there had always been a difference r61es of faith and reason. What was new them. From about 1320 the attitude dictum, " I understand to believe", w the attempt at finding a union between which had been the objective of both was abandoned. During the next thir transformed, from a positive effort to supernatural, into an attitude which one of criticism and scepticism.
This upheaval was not the work of any in a sense the rupture between faith and very attempt to establish a causal con high and the actions of his creatures on were already apparent in St. Thomas impact of the rediscovery of Aristotle did not accept Aristotle without a str tions culminated in those of 1277, wh pronounced against 219 theses associa attack was directed primarily against who asserted that natural reason was self the guidance of theology to reach the give added impetus to the distrust of th ing God, and to the desire for a return way of viewing him. It led to a serie Aristotelian-Thomist outlook, writte secular thinkers. These helped to ma of the fourteenth century; but it was n Scotus and, later, William of Ockham, t really began.
Duns Scotus (d. 13o8)9 gave open expression to the rejection of reason from questions of faith. God, he held, was so free and his ways so unknowable they could not be assessed by human means. Accordingly there could be no place for analogy or causality in discussing him; he was beyond all calculation. Duns, in the great emphasis he placed on God's freedom, put theology outside the reach of reason. 10 This was his most momentous bequest to the fourteenth century, for around the freedom of God's will revolved the main questions that were to exercise his successors in the next generation. Once it was held that God was too infinitely free to be within the ken of practical knowledge, the question naturally arose -What was the relation of God's will to free will in man ? Or, put another way, How could natural phenomena be judged in the light of God's will if his ways were unknowable?
Duns did not attempt to introduce the new questions, which naturally followed from this changed view of divine and human relations. They were brought in by the far more radical thinking of William of Ockham (d. 1349).11 He gave full rein to the divorce between practical and theoretical knowledge and, unlike Duns, went on to apply the consequences to man's relation to God. In his Commentary on the Sentences (I3I8) Ockham divided knowledge into two kinds -intuitive and abstract.12 Intuitive knowledge was concerned only with the existence of an object, with its immediate impact on the senses. Abstract knowledge involved a mental process in which the mind reflected on what had been brought to its attention, even though the original object were no longer present. This distinction enabled Ockham to show that the process of knowing did not necessarily imply the existence of the object known. Abstract knowledge accordingly dealt with terms (suppositiones) and thus all thinking was the arranging of concepts which might or might not correspond with real things. By making sensory experience the sole criterion of reality all but individuals became mental constructions. As a result, species, values, and all other abstractions, were placed beyond the range of intuitive knowledge. This division meant that there had to be two different standards of truth: proof could extend only to what could be ascertained in practice; everything else was a matter of speculation, allowing of no certainty, and at best no more than probable. Only when we regard Ockhamism in this light can we speak of scepticism; as a theory of knowledge it approximated more to what we should call empiricism, restricting knowledge to practice. Doubt did not arise at the level of experience, but was reserved for all that lay beyond it.
Had Ockham left his discussion as a general statement of verification it could justly be argued, as certain modern historians do,13
that he was not a sceptic; but he did not stop there, and it is in his application of his theory to matters of theology that its effects were most far-reaching.
In turning to theology Ockham was concerned primarily with human free will. The problem was raised by means of the longaccepted distinction between God's two kinds of power -his ordained power and his absolute power. God's ordained power (potentia ordinata) consisted of his decrees as revealed in the Bible and by ecclesiastical authority. It applied only to this world and his creatures, providing them with the constant and requisite standards by which they were to be g ordained power applied to his creatur nature. God's absolute power (poten hand, was concerned primarily with God to this or any other universe. It deno and simply, and as such was no way invo This is borne out by the topics it governed: far from being applied indiscriminately to every question it was reserved for those in which faith and reason could proffer different answers. There is no evidence that it was applied either to purely theological problems, such as the relation of the Divine Persons to one another, or to problems which allowed of a fully empirical answer, such as questions of physics concerning the relation of bodies or the property of matter.
The prevailing topics to which God's absolute power was addressed were grace and, less frequently, free future actions. Each of these subjects was an aspect of the relation of free will to divine will. Grace dealt with free will's resources; future actions with its scope. Each of them was in a very real sense new: although they had played a very important part in St. Augustine's controversies with Pelagius, there were not then the same implications or issues. Moreover, among Ockham's followers, especially Robert Holcot, Thomas Buckingham, and Adam of Woodham, these two topics occupy a central place in their Commentaries on the Sentences. Similarly, among the opponents of the sceptics, of whom Thomas Bradwardine is the outstanding example, the same emphasis was laid upon grace and future actions. Even a thinker like Robert Halifax, although uninvolved in the disputes themselves, followed substantially the same arrangement in his Commentary. Ockham himself had pursued the full range of questions covered by the original Master of the Sentences, Peter Lombard'4: grouped into four books they aimed to elucidate the fundamental problems of theology."5 Before long they had become a standard text for every student of theology; and a commentary on the original four books became part of the course for a Master of Theology. From the time of Ockham's Commentary the questions diminished in number and increasingly concentrated on free will.16 Thus not only was there a change in the questions raised, but also in the positions taken up over them: and it is in this sense that we can talk of a new climate of thought in the fourteenth century.
So far as grace was concerned, the issue revolved round the need, if any, of free will to possess a supernatural habit in order to achieve a good deed, remain free from sin, or gain God's glory in the next world. Tradition said that grace was necessary;" the sceptics, applying the concept of God's absolute power, said that grace could be dispensed with and that man could do all that God required of him just as well without it.18 God's omnipotence was used to free man from God's own ordinances: and in keeping with the sceptics' emphasis on the limits of knowledge they were content to view man in natural and human terms and to dispense with dogma in discussing him. This not only excluded theology from the discussion, but also cast doubt on its tenets; for the sceptics, in their rejection of grace, further denied its inherent efficacy and its constant r61e in salvation.'9 Consequently all standards and values went by the board; good and evil were not necessarily mutually exclusive; and salvation itself ceased to bear a direct relation to grace. It is not hard to see how such an attitude reduced all dogmatic teaching to a nullity, and prevented man's powers from being discussed meaningfully except in natural terms, where kn to the test of experience.
The same position is apparent over the fre actions of free will (future contingents). Th honoured problem -How God's immutable kn he foresaw to take place freely ? That is, if G past, present, and future, how can his creatures have the power not to act ? In the case of Soc God foresees all that Socrates will do and will enjoy real freedom in choosing his own actio either that Socrates has his freedom violated by of what should rest with Socrates alone, or t to rest entirely with Socrates, God cannot be a takes place. Clearly such a problem involved that man had from God. Once the tradition man's relation to God had been rejected, the also was no longer valid. Instead of regardin in this world (free will included) as the result sceptics made an issue between God's will refused to regard the future as the same as the While both the latter, as already in existence, w future, as still to be, was not.20 The temporal m world came before the concept of eternity as If the future were contingent how could God kn the sceptics never attempted to reconcile God free future actions by man. Instead they tended different alternatives. The first was that God omniscient, had to make his knowledge of contin never occur, correspondingly contingent; ot prejudging what had not yet been decided. T knowing all that was to happen, God had to risk b making revelation by his word fallible, since it re The other alternative was to limit God's forekno certain, thereby obviating any threat to the cer by regarding it as necessary knowledge.2 In eith of God's attributes to temporal and natural cons Since the future must exist, it cannot be doubte corresponding certainty so far as God was con the mode of his knowledge had to be adapted sideration of the future's existence.
Each of these groups of questions had ramifications which extended beyond their immediate discussion. They constituted an attack on theology which was bound not to go unanswered. So far, less is known about the opponents of scepticism than about the sceptics. The most outstanding anti-sceptic was Thomas Bradwardine, whose great treatise De Causa Dei was directed expressly to rebutting their assertions that free will was independent of grace or that God's foreknowledge was in any way dependent on or restricted by the free future actions of the human will.23 De Causa Dei is chiefly interesting on two counts. Firstly, it was devoted to the twin questions of grace and future contingents, its subject dictated by the problems raised by the sceptics. Secondly, it is significant for the extreme views it propounded in reply. Bradwardine was not content simply to meet the sceptics on their own ground; he threw scorn on the very claim of reason to know or judge anything, least of all that which concerned God. In reply to their claims for free will, Bradwardine made theology and dogma the only touchstone. Where the sceptics had consigned God to the margins, in their emphasis on the natural and the human, Bradwardine left no room for anything but God. In effect Bradwardine answered the sceptics' one-dimensional outlook of the natural by the equally single dimension of the divine. The two sides were in head-on collision over the foundations of scholasticism.
II
Regarded in this way the disputes of the fourteenth century cannot be understood by the traditional categories. They were challenging the very concepts on which the latter were founded -namely the unity of faith and reason. This preoccupation with the place of the divine in the created gave to the disputes of the early fourteenth century their positive features, of which we may discern three.
The first was the replacement of the traditional systems, such as Augustinianism and Thomism, by the division into those thinkers who, following Ockham, refused to look beyond proof and practice for certain knowledge, and those who, like Bradwardine, made the authority of dogma the centre of all truth and knowledge. For want of better terms we may for convenience describe these two attitudes as scepticism and authority.
Secondly, there was the startling innovation of God's potentia absoluta. The importance of its use cannot be stressed too much, for it introduced a new dimension into the discussion. It constituted a destructive force which rendered unrecognizable not only the traditional landmarks of theology but also God himself. It was the core of fourteenth-century scepticism; it allowed anything to be possible and thus opened the floodgates to what had previously been considered impossible, excluding nothing from c God so will it.
Thirdly this gave rise to new questions and views, such as those already mentioned concerning grace and future contingents. It led to the recasting of the main concepts so that they bore little recognizable relationship to those of tradition. By the older standards most of the fourteenth century thinkers were eclectics who took their ideas where they could find them without following one system to the exclusion of all others. For them it was not primarily a matter of Nominalism or Realism, even though the problem of genera, species, and individuals was involved: Ockham, as has been suggested, was not simply concerned to reject any category but the individual from the strictly logical standpoint, but was governed equally by theology. Similarly, with Bradwardine, not only was De Causa Dei directed to the relation of the divine and human wills, to the virtual exclusion of everything else; his disavowal of reason cut at the roots of scholasticism. Even while they still employed much of the equipment and method of the thirteenth century, the thinkers of the fourteenth century were putting them to different use. They discussed God only to show that he could not validly be discussed; they related his will to free will only to show how impossible such a task really was; they employed the scholastic divisions and proofs in a way that denied the relevance of their traditional aims. To compare Ockham's view of God with, say, St. Bonaventure's, is to see that Ockham need not be discussing God at all. To examine the lengths to which Bradwardine went in asserting God's omnipotence is to realize how great a rejection of reason it constituted. Each side in the extreme degree to which it went in favour of the natural or the divine left no room for intermediaries; and even the place of the Church tended to be neglected.
The rise of scepticism and authority was, then, the central fact in the history of the thought of the first part of the fourteenth century. So far it has been virtually ignored since there is still too little evidence to provide a rounded picture of the period. Moreover the era of extreme unorthodoxy seems to have worked itself out by the 1360's. Nevertheless there can be no doubt about the preoccupation with the questions discussed above during the earlier period, nor of the extreme and novel positions to which they led. In the long run they were not without their effect. It is not too much to say that had there been no breach in the union between faith and reason during the early fourteenth century, there could have been no Renaissance or Reformation. Each of those movements, imprecise though they may be, represented the separation of the natural and the supernatural and their development along their independent courses. The essence of what we call the Renaissance lay in its interest in the natural and the human, whether among its painters, its political theorists, or its men of science. Neither the Prince, nor the drawings and notes of Leonardo da Vinci, nor the scientific theories which issued in Galileo's discoveries, could have taken place within the limits of the medieval outlook. So long as revealed truth remained the touchstone of all inquiry, and everything had to be seen in relation to both its formal and its final causes, there could be no room for thorough-going experiment, which is the basis of science. Only with the break-up of the closeknit pattern of knowledge and belief did experiment become possible. The emphasis of the sceptics on verification of all experience tended in this direction, for it made natural causality the only yardstick, quite independent of theology. The same process was no less evident in political thought, where the rejection, by Ockham himself and by Marsiglio of Padua, of the political r61e of the Church, led to Machiavelli's total disregard of any but secular ends.
On the part of authority, no less, the position taken by Bradwardine of sole reliance on dogma to the exclusion of reason or natural experience tended to make theology self-sufficient. The Reformers, whatever their other differences, contrived to see theology as truth in itself; they, too, like Bradwardine, felt no need for the niceties of dispute, or for intermediaries, in knowing God. Whether this was to be by the personal experience which brought each man to God through the grace in his own soul, or by the eternal ordinances of God's decree, faith alone was necessary. Thus the different doctrines of the Reformation, whether of Luther or of Calvin, contained an important element of the outlook generated in the disputes of the early fourteenth century. They made the divorce which began then between theology and philosophy complete.
These are the general trends to which the fourteenth century divisions gave rise. No one would pretend that the links between them have been established conclusively, or that their full import has been clearly assessed. Nevertheless enough has been suggested to show how important these disputes were. They marked a change in direction for medieval thought; they pointed to the downward path on which the union between the divine and the created was to enter.
Manchester. Gordon Leff. ' Duns Scotus has not provided historians of thought with the comparatively intelligible outlook of St. Thomas, due mainly to his early death while still formulating his ideas, the badly damaged state of the texts, and the peculiar subtlety of his thought; he was known as doctor subtilis. The latest work on him is E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scotus (Paris, 1952) .
10 Gilson, op. cit., has shown how Duns was reacting against the determinism of the Arab thinkers, such as Averroes. His proof of God's existence had nothing to do with cause or analogy, but was based on the purely abstract concept of being which God shared with everything in existence; from this Duns saw God as infinite being. 1x There is no standard work on Ockham: he is too controversial a figure and he permits of too many different interpretations to make possible any generally accepted assessment. Moreover, it is only within the last two decades that he has come to be widely studied. L. Baudry, Guillaume d'Occam; sa vie, ses oeuvres, ses iddes, provides a useful introduction and bibliography.
12 Sentences, Prologue, p. I (Edn., Lyons, 1495 
